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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
SOUTHERN DIVISION 







16 NEW ENGLAND TECHNOLOGY, 











ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES 
[filed 10/11/07) 
26 On September 26,2007, this Court entered a judgment in favor of Plaintiff Toshiba 
27 America Information Systems, Inc. ("TArS") in the amount of $482,430.00, plus interest, 
28 costs and attorneys' fees to be resolved by way of motion filed with the Court. T AIS 
-I-
Case 8:05-cv·00955·CJC·MLG Document 66 Filed 11/14/2007 Page 2 of 10 
filed a motion for attorneys' fees on October 11,2007, seeking to recover $996,865.83 in 
2 attorneys' fees. Defendant New England Technology, Inc. ("NEIl") asserts that the 
3 motion for fees should be denied because it was not timely filed, it improperly seeks fees 
4 in relation to the litigation ofNETl's counterclaim, and because TAIS has not submitted 
5 sufficient evidence to justifY such a large award of fees. Because the Court agrees that 
6 the motion was not timely filed and that T AIS has not submitted sufficient evidence to 




11 NETl argues that TAIS' motion must be denied because it was not tlled within 
12 fourteen days of the entry of judgment, in violation of FED. R. CIV. P. 54(D)(2)(B) and 
13 Central District L.R. 54-12. The Court finds that TArS' motion was untimely because 
14 the Court entered judgment on September 26, 2007, and TAIS' motion was not filed until 
15 October 11, 2007, 15 days later. The 14 day deadline under Rule 54( d)(2)(B) includes 
16 Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. Failure to file a motion for attorneys' fees within 
17 the prescribed time period waives a party's right to request fees. Port a/Stockton v. 
18 Western Bulk Carrier KS, 371 FJd 1119, 1121-1122 (9th Cir. 2004). FED. R. ClV. P. 
19 6(B), however, permits a court to enlarge the period of time within which a party must 
20 file a motion for attorneys' fees "where the failure to act was the result of excusable 
21 neglect. .. " Unfortunately for T AIS, its one~day delay in filing its motion was not the 
22 result of "excusable neglect." 
23 
24 In Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co v. BrunswickAssocs. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380 (l993), the 
25 Supreme Court articulated the test for determining when a party's delay in filing qualifies 
26 as "excusable neglect." In Pioneer, the party seeking excusal of a late filing in a 
27 bankruptcy case alleged that the delay was the result of upheaval in his law practice and 
28 due to the fact that the notice of the bar date was inconspicuous and outside the ordinary 
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course in a bankruptcy proceeding. Id. at 398. In considering whether these 
2 circumstances qualified as "excusable neglect," the Court first noted that "inadvertence, 
3 ignorance of the rules, or mistakes construing the rules do not usually constitute 
4 'excusable' neglect", Id at 392. The court held "the determination is at bottom an 
5 equitable one, taking account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the party's 
6 omission. These include ... the danger of prejudice to the debtor, the length of the delay 
7 and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, including 
8 whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and whether the movant 
9 acted in good faith." 507 U.S. at 395. Based on this understanding of "excusable 
10 neglect," the Court rejected the argument that upheaval in a law practice excused a late 
11 filing. The Court did find, however, that the notice ofthe filing date was so inadequate 
12 that it did qualify as an excuse for the untimely filing. The Court stated, "the peculiar 
13 and inconspicuous placement of the bar date in a notice regarding a creditors meeting, 
14 without any indication of the significance of the bar date, left a dramatic ambiguity in the 
IS notification." Jd. at 398. The Court also found it significant that the delay had not caused 
16 prejudice to the other side and it was not the result of bad faith. Id. I 
17 
18 Although Pioneer made it clear that a finding of "excusable neglect" is an 
19 equitable determination, the Ninth Circuit subsequently held that the party seeking a 
20 reprieve still has a high threshold to meet. See Kyle v. Campbell Soup Co., 28 F.3d 928 
21 (9th Cir. 1994); Committee/or Idaho's High Desert v. Yost, 92 FJd 814 (9th Cir. 1996), 
22 In Kyle, the party who had filed an untimely motion for attorneys' fees argued that she 
23 should receive an enlargement oftime because she mistakenly believed that a local rule 
24 permitted her to add three days to the time period after entry of judgment. 28 F.3d at 
25 930. While the Ninth Circuit considered the Pioneer factors in making its ruling, the 
26 
27 I While Pioneer addressed a delay in filing under with Bankruptcy rule 9006(b)(l), the Ninth Circuit has 
held that the Pioneer test is applicable to cases involving a motion for attonltly's fees and a request for 
28 an enlargement, under Fed. R. eiv. P. 54(d) and 6(b), respectively. See Committee/or Idaho's High 
Desert v. Yost, 92 F.3d 814,825 n. 4 (9th Cif. 1996). 
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court noted that Pioneer did not change "the general rule that a mistake of law does not 
2 constitute excusable neglect" Id at 932. While the party seeking fees in Pioneer failed 
3 to meet the deadline because of a "dramatic ambiguity," Kyle delayed because she 
4 misconstrued rules which were unambiguous. Id at 931, Therefore, even though Kyle's 
$ attorney had acted in good faith and Campbell Soup did not suffer prejudice from the 
6 delay, a misunderstanding oflocal rules did not qualify as "excusable neglect." ld at 
7 931. The court held that in the absence of "a persuasive justification for, , . 
8 misconstruction of non ambiguous rules" there was "no basis for deviating from the 
9 general rule," ld. at 931-32, 
10 
II In Yost, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its ruling in Kyle, concluding that if 
12 misconstruction ofa non-ambiguous rule cannot justify an extension of time for seeking 
13 attorneys' fees, a party's ignorance of an amendment to a rule likewise cannot qualify as 
14 "excusable neglect" 92 F.3d at 825, Although the Ninth Circuit did not provide an 
15 exhaustive list of situations that would qualify as "excusable neglect," in affirming the 
16 district court's ruling, it indicated its approval of the following examples: "compelling 
17 circumstances, ... such as illness, injury or death of counsel, or members of his family, or 
18 fire, flood, vandalism or destruction of counsel's law office or word processing 
19 equipment." ld. at 824. Kyle and Yost thus stand for the proposition that even a good 
20 faith mistake that does not result in prejudice to the other side is not a sufficient reason to 
21 enlarge the time period for requesting fees, absent some other evidence of "compelling 
22 circumstances." 
23 
24 Here, TAIS' purported reason for its delay is that its courier was caught in traffic a 
25 3 :30 in the afternoon in Santa Ana, California. Mr. Mersel, attorney for TAIS, asserts 
26 that he waited until 3: 14 p.m. on the last day of the filing period to deliver the motion to 
27 Morrison & Foerster's regular courier service. (Mersel DeeL, '112,) Mr. Mersel asserts 
28 that although he was aware that the filing deadline was 4:00 p.m., he had "never had a 
·4· 
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problem with getting papers filed by 4:00 p.m. when delivering them to the attorney 
2 service" forty-five minutes in advance. (ld.) The courier, Mr. Moskus, swiftly responde 
3 to Mr. Mersel'$ request, leaving on his motorcycle for the courthouse at approximately 
4 3:30 p.m. (Moskus Decl., ~ 3,) Unfortunately, Mr. Moskus encountered "unusually 
5 heavy traffic" and had to "wait at the railroad crossing on Grand Avenue for a long train 
6 to pass." (Moskus Dele., 'U 3.) Consequently, Mr. Moskus arrived at the Courthouse afte 
7 the office had closed and Mr. Mersel was unable to file the motion until the following 
8 day, on October 11, 2007. (Mersel Decl., ~ 7.) 
9 
10 These circumstances, however regrettable, do not meet the standard for "excusable 
11 neglect." Although the delay was not lengthy and it does not appear that NETI was 
12 prejudiced by it, the reason for the delay was entirely within TAIS' control and TAIS has 
13 not offered a good faith reason for the delay, Given that the Ninth Circuit has held that a 
14 good faith misunderstanding of local rules is not sufficient to rise to the standard of 
15 "excusable neglect," the entirely foreseeable obstacle of traffic in Southern California in 
16 the late afternoon also cannot justify an enlargement of time. Unlike the parties in Yost 
17 and Kyle, Mr. Mersel is not even arguing that he had a good faith reaSon to believe that 
I s he had extra time to file the motion for fees. Instead, Mr. Merse! asserts that he has a 
19 practice of waiting unti145 minutes prior to the filing deadline before passing off a 
20 motion to his courier, and because that plan has worked in the past, it should have been 
21 sufficient on this occasion. Although this pattern of conduct may have previously 
22 worked for Mr. Mersel, it is not a good faith reason for the delay. Unlike the 
23 circumstances discussed in Yost that would constitute legitimate reasons for delay, such 
24 as the illness of counselor destruction of his law office, the reason for delay in this Case 
25 was entirely foreseeable and avoidable. Mr. Merse! knew since at least September 10, 
26 2007, the date of this Court's Tentative Order Granting TAIS' Motions for Summary 
27 Judgment, that he would need to prepare a motion for attorneys' fees. He waited a month 
28 later, until 3;14 p.m. on October 10, to attempt to file the motion. Because Mr. Mersel 
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made a conscious decision to wait until the final hour to file his motion, he assumed the 
2 risk that on October 10, his luck would run out. 
3 
4 This case is distinguishable from Pioneer because encountering traffic in Orange 
5 County is in no way analogous to being misled by the "dramatic ambiguity" of a faulty 
6 notice of a bar date in a bankruptcy proceeding. When Mr. Moskus set out at 3:30 p.m. 
7 to travel to the Courthouse, it was entirely predictable that he might not arrive by 4:00 
8 p.m, Even If Mr. Moskus assured Mr. Mersel that forty-five minutes would be sufficient 
9 time to file the papers, Mr. Mersel was not the victim of any "dramatic ambiguity" in 
10 circumstances. Considering all ofthe circumstances and keeping in mind that the 
I I Pioneer test is an equitable one, the Court finds that T AIS' proffered reason for delay 
12 does not justify an enlargement of the time period for filing its motion.2 
13 
14 The Court also finds that TAIS' motion for attorneys' fees is inadequate because it 
15 is not suppOited by sufficient evidence. When a party files a motion for attorneys' fees, 
16 the burden is on the fee applicant to substantiate the hours worked and the rate claimed. 
17 Strange v. Monogram Credit Card Banko/Georgia, 129 F.3d 943,945 (7th Cir. 1997); 
18 Saizan v. Delta Concrete Products Co., Inc., 448 FJd 795,799 (5th Cir. 2006), To meet 
19 this burden, the fee applicant must produce evidence "that the requested rates are in line 
20 with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably 
21 comparable skill, experience, and reputation." Sorenson v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140, 1145 
22 
23 
'This case is also distinguishable from Bateman v. United States Postal Serv" 231 F ,3d 1220 (9th Cif. 
24 2000), another case in which the Ninth Cifcuit held that the moving party had established "excusable 
neglect." In Bateman, the plaintiff's attorney missed the deadline to file a responsive pleading because 
25 he was in Nigeria handling a family emergency, Id. at 1222. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district 
26 court's ruling against the plaintiff because the lower court failed to conduct the equitable analysis laid 
out in Pioneer and bccause the plaintiff s attorney had not acted in bad faith, ld. at 1224~25. Unlike the 
27 district court in Bateman, this Court properly considered the Pioneer factors and determined that TAIS 
had not provided II good faith reason for the delay. A family emergency that requires an attorney to 
Z8 travel to a foreign country provides considerably more justification for a finding of good faith than a 
decision to wait until the final hour to file a motiou for fees. 
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(9th Cir. 2001). "Where the documentation of hours is inadequate, the district court may 
2 reduce the award accordingly. The district court also should exclude from this initial fee 
3 calculation hOllrs that were not 'reasonably expended.'" Id. at 1146. While a district 
4 court has wide latitude to determine the number of hours that were "reasonably 
5 expended," it must provide enough of an explanation to provide for meaningful review of 
6 the fee award. Id. 
7 
S A district court's award offees may be set aside if the court is unable to make any 
9 findings that the hours expended were reasonable, because the fee applicant only 
10 provided general summaries of attorney work and time spent. See Intel Corp, v. Terabyte 
II Intern., Inc., 6 FJd 614 (9th Cir. 1993). In Intel, the court explained that although 
12 summaries of work can be used to determine reasonable hours, these summaries must be 
13 supported by the underlying material so that the party paying the fees can see what was 













While the district COUlt did have evidence ofIntel's hours expended and its 
customary fees, the comt made no findings that the hours expended were 
reasonable and that the hourly rates were customary. The order merely awarded 
the fees without elaboration. Such a procedure is inadequate. That is particularly 
true where, as here, the requesting party submits mere summaries of hours 
worked, ,. those summaries alone made it very difficult to ascertain whether the 
time devoted to particular tasks was reasonable and whether there was improper 
overlapping of hours. Terabyte was not required to take Intel's word that every 
hour was needed and all overlap had been eliminated. While summaries can be 
used in proper circumstances, the underlying material must be made available. Fed. 
R. Evid. 1006. Under our adversary system, Terabyte was entitled to see just what 
was charged and why. What may seem obvious to Intel and to the district court is 
not obvious to us. That, among other reasons, explains our long-standing 
insistence Upon a proper explanation of any fee award. It also explains Terabyte's 
need and right to peruse and parse Intel's fee demand. 
27 ld. at 622-23. 
28 
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Here, the declarations submitted by T AIS are inadequate because they are also 
2 mere summaries of attorney work and time spent, without any connection between the 
3 listed hours and a particular task. As a result, this Court cannot properly determine 
4 whether the hours expended were reasonable, whether the rates were customary, or if 
5 there was improper overlapping of hours among TArS' various attorneys. For example, 
6 the declaration submitted by TAIS' in-house counsel, Mr. Wafel, fails to provide any 
7 detailed evidence of alleged time spent on TArS' complaint. Mr. Wafel declares "[m]y 
8 average work week is forty to fifty hours. Over the course of this approximately twenty 
9 five months since the commencement of this litigation, I have dedicated on average ten to 
10 fifteen percent of my work time to activities directly related to this litigation. This has 
11 amounted to approximately 520 hours of time." (Wafel DecL, ~ 8.) Not only has Mr. 
12 Wafel failed to keep an exact record of his hours, he failed to link this vague estimate to 
13 any specific activities. While Mr. Wafel vaguely described various activities performed 
14 in connection with the case (reviewing all pleadings, attending all depositions), he did not 
15 state how long any of these tasks took him to complete. The Court theretbre has no way 
16 of knowing if 520 hours is a reasonable amount of time to have spent on these activities. 
17 Because the descriptions are so vague. the Court also cannot determine if Mr. Wafel's 
18 work was duplicative of T AIS' other attorneys efforts or if the work waS necessary to 
19 properly litigate this case. 
20 
21 The declaration of Mr. Irby, another attorney for TAIS, provides a more specific 
22 estimate of total hours, breaking them down into tenths of an hour, but it does not itemize 
23 a single task performed in conjunction with the case. (See Irby Dec!., ~~ 1-2.) The 
24 declaration ofMr. Duffy provides a more detailed list of the activities that he and Mr. 
2$ Irby performed on the case, along with a billing summary that lists the total hours 
26 worked. (Duffy DecL, ~ 3, Exh. A-I thereto.) Yet the declaration was only signed by Mr. 
27 DuffY, not Mr. Irhy, and it does not state how long any of the activities took to complete. 
28 
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The declaration submitted by Mr. Merse! of Morrison & Foerster suffers from the 
2 same deficits. The declaration summarily describes the work performed by Morrison & 
3 Foerster ("prepared for and defended the depositions of key TAIS officers," "began and 
4 led the trial preparation efforts") and it provides a billing summary that lists the hourly 
5 rates, hours billed, and total fees for each attorney at Morrison & Foerster that worked on 
6 the case. (Mersel Dec!., ~ 8, Exh. A thereto.) Yet like all of the other declarations 
7 submitted by T AIS, it does not link any of the hours billed to the activities performed on 
8 the case. Without further elaboration, the Court cannot determine ifthe hours expended 
9 by T AIS' various attorneys were reasonable because the Court has no idea how much of 
10 the total time was spent on anyone activity. The Court also cannot determine if the 
11 various attorneys engaged in duplicative efforts. While an claimant seeking fees "is not 
12 required to record in great detail how each minute of his time was expended" (see Trs. 0 
13 the Dirs. Guild of Am. ~Producer Pension Benefits Plans v. Tise, 234 F.3d 414,427 (9th 
14 Cir. 2000)), he must do more than submit a general summary of tasks along with a 
15 separate summary of hours. 
16 
17 With respect to NETI's argument that TAIS is not entitled to fee reimbursement 
18 for the work performed in defending against NETI's counterclaim, the Court finds that 
19 T AIS would be entitled to attorneys' fees for activities that were necessary to both defen 
20 against NETI's counterclaim and to litigate TAIS' complaint. However, TAIS is not 
21 entitled to fees for those activities that were only undertaken to defend against the 
22 counterclaim. Yet the Court cannot determine the amount of fees that T AIS' attorneys 
23 would be entitled to for those overlapping activities because the hours listed are not 
24 linked to the work performed and because the activities are vaguely described in many of 
25 the declarations. NETI is not required to take T AIS' word that every hour was needed 
26 and all overlap had been eliminated. Intel Corp., supra, 6 F.3d at 623. Because NETI is 
27 "entitled to see just what was charged and why," the Court finds that TAIS' evidence in 
28 
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support of its motion is inadequate. Jd. For all of the foregoing reasons, TAIS' motion 



























CORMAC J. CARNEY 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
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